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Economic Growth and 
Structural Unemployment 
Address by 
Andrew F. Brimmer 
President 
BRIMMER AND COMPANY, INC. 
Economic and Financial Consultants 
A fundamental issue in the current debate over national economic 
policy concerns the best way to attack the problem of structnral unem-
ployment. The natnre of the difficulty is reasonably well understood: 
even when the economy is expanding and overall joblessness is declin-
ing, unemployment within certain groups is cut very little - if at all. 
Blacks are heavily represented among those suffering from persistent 
structural unemployment. A number of depressed geographical areas 
(both urban and rural) also bear a disproportionate share of the types 
of unemployment that do not respond appreciably to improvement in 
economic conditions. 
The question of structnral unemployment was one of the topics dis-
cussed at the White House Conference on Balanced National Growth 
and Economic Development held in January, 1978. I participated in the 
General Session which focused on the subject: "Structural Unemploy-
ment: Should We Move People to Jobs or Jobs to People." In my as-
signment, I tried to spell out as carefully as possible some of the key 
background elements which I believe must be considered in any search 
for ways to reduce structnral unemployment. 
Given my own professional experiences (which have been mainly in 
the area of national economic policy rather than in the development or 
management of manpower programs), when I accepted the invitation 
to participate in the program, I indicated that I would attempt to pro-
vide a macro-economic perspective on the challenges we face (and the 
opportunities open to us) in the effort to create jobs for disadvantaged 
workers. 
Dr. Brimmer is President of Brimmer and Company, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based economic 
and financial consulting firm. From March, 1966, through August, 1974, he was a Member of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.System. 
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The problems of structural unemployment have attracted a number 
of experts who have first-hand experiences gained through frontline 
contact with - and daily struggles to overcome - the obstacles which 
impede the employment of labor market participants with few saleable 
skills. I can make little or no contribution to that part of the agenda. 
However, I have identified a number of key elements which I believe 
should receive consideration in the search for ways to reduce structural 
unemployment. These are discussed in subsequent sections of these 
remar ks. The highlights can be summarized here: 
- A fundamental pre-condition for the success of any specially-targeted 
program to cope with structural unemployment is a vigorous and sus-
tained expansion in overall economic activity. A sluggish economy (even 
if recessions are avoided) is a harsh and inhospitable soil for the cultiva-
tion of jobs for the hard-to-employ. 
- The strategic role of economic growth in the generation of jobs is clearly 
demonstrated by the experience over the last decade and a half. The 16 
years ending in 1977 were divided equally between eight years of sus-
tained economic expansion and eight years of recession, inflation, and 
stagnation. The effects on jobs stand out sharply: the first half of the 
period was one of expanding jobs and declining unemployment. The 
second half was one of slow growth in jobs and sharply rising unemploy-
ment. 
- Against this background, the Carter Administration's proposed $25 bil-
lion tax reduction for individuals and businesses represents a wise move. 
Without such action, the American economy would face a "growth 
recession" in 1979 - meaning a rise in real gross national product less 
than the 4.0 percent necessary to prevent an increase in unemployment. 
- Whenever we focus on structural unemployment, there is no way to 
avoid an explicit appreciation of the distressing situation among blacks 
as a group, and not simply among black teenagers. During the 1973-75 
recession, blacks had to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of 
increased unemployment. Moreover, during the last 33 months of 
economic recovery. blacks have gotten a smaller fraction of the added 
jobs compared with their relative position in the labor market. Ovcr the 
same period, the level of unemployment among blacks actually rose 
slightly, while total unemployment declined noticeably. 
- In preparing programs to attack structural unemployment, it is necessary 
to keep in mind a number of changing demographic characteristics of the 
civilian labor force, since these will have an impact on. the competition 
for jobs in the years ahead. For example, over the last decade and a half, 
a dramatic rise in the participation of both women and teenagers in the 
labor force has aggravated unemployment. However, over the next sev-
eral years, as the shadow of the 1960' s drop in birth rates is cast into the 
1970's and 80's, the youth population will decline. The result will be a 
slight lessening in labor market pressures following from fewer teenagers 
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seeking jobs. The effect on labor markets of increased job-seeking by 
women will also moderate somewhat over the remainder of this decade. 
But, on balance, the above-average participation of both women and 
teenagers in the work force will continue to make it hard to reduce struc-
tural unemployment. 
- Another long-run trend which must be kept in mind is the differential 
rate of growth in population, jobs and money income in central cities 
compared with the suburbs in major metropolitan areas. As is generally 
recognized, over the last decade and a half, most central cities have ex-
perienced an absolute decline in population. But a substantial number of 
these cities have also had a relatively larger absolute decline in the num-
ber of jobs. The net effect has been a clear tendency for the cities to fall 
behind relative to the suburbs. 
- Among many persons concerned with structural unemployment, a con-
siderable amount of hope is being attached to the Humphrey-Hawkins 
bill, which aims at a significant reduction in the excessively high level of 
unemployment over the next five years. However, my assessment of the 
potential impact of the proposal leads me to be less optimistic than most 
of the bill's proponents. 
- In particular, too much hope is being placed on the expected expansion 
of public service jobs. Instead, we must look to greater efforts to increase 
openings on private payrolls. 
- In this regard, it is clear that private employers will need some kind of 
federal government subsidy to help offset the extra costs of hiring any 
significant number of marginal workers. If the $400 million of subsidy 
recently recommended by the Carter Administration were nsed with 
imagination, perhaps 252,000 entry-level jobs could be created. The 
same amount spent on public service jobs may generate only 44,000 new 
openings. 
- In addition, private employers will also need inducements to locate pro-
duction, distribution and service facilities in central cities - from which 
many firms are continuing to migrate. Liberalized use of the investment 
tax credit could help offset the extra costs of making investment expen-
ditures in these areas. 
Each of the above conclusions is amplified in the rest of these 
remarks. 
Economic Growth and Employment 
The strategic role of economic growth in generating jobs shows 
through clearly in the statistical evidence tracing changes in output and 
employment during the last decade and a half. The longest sustained 
expansion in economic activity in the post World War II period oc-
curred during the eight years 1961-1969. As shown in Table 1 t, over 
t See Appendix, page 59. 
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these years gross national product corrected for inflation (real GNP) 
rose at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent. The civilian labor force 
climbed by 10.3 million; employment rose by 12.2 million, and the 
number of unemployed workers dropped by 1.9 million. These figures 
represented annual average rates of change of 1.7 percent, 2.1 percent, 
and 6.0 percent, respectively. Over these eight years the overall unem-
ployment rate decreased from 6.7 percent in 1961 to 3.5 percent in 
1969. 
Even more striking was the decrease in long-term unemployment (27 
weeks and over). In 1961 there were 804,000 persons in this category-
representing 17.1 percent of the total unemployment of 4,713,000. By 
1969 the number of long-term unemployed had shrunk to 133,000 and 
accounted for only 4.7 percent of total joblessness, which in turn had 
fallen to 2,832,000. 
In sharp contrast, between 1969 and 1977 (also a period of eight 
years), real GNP expanded at an average annual rate of 2.7 percent-
far below the historical trend of approximately 3.6 percent over the 30 
years ending in 1977. The reasons for this relatively poor performance 
of the national economy were a mixture of inflation, recession, and 
stagnation - partly caused by a five-fold jump in the price of oil but 
also aggravated by a combination of inappropriate monetary and fiscal 
policies. In this environment the civilian labor force continued to 
expand - climbing by 17.0 million. However, the number of jobs rose 
by only 13.1 million; and unemployment jumped by 3.9 million. These 
figures represented average annual rates of change of 2.4 per cent, 1.9 
percent, and 11.5 percent respectively. During this second eight-year 
period, the overall unemployment rate rose from 3.5 percent to 6.9 
percent of the civilian labor force. 
The impact of these trends on the long-term unemployed was 
predictable. Between 1969 and 1977 this category of joblessness rose by 
813,000 to 946,000. Last year, the latter figure was equal to 14.0 per-
cent of total unemployment - which in turn had climbed to 6,772,000. 
In summary, the last decade and a half of American economic his-
tory can be divided equally between eight years of sustained economic 
expansion and eight years of recession, inflation, and stagnation. The 
effects on jobs stand out sharply: the first half of the period was one of 
expanding jobs and declining unemployment. The second half was one 
of slow growth in jobs and sharply rising unemployment. 
What is the lesson to be learned from the foregoing experience? It is 
unmistakable: a sustained, high level of real economic growth is a nec-
essary underpinning for any program to create jobs for the dis-
advantaged. 
What are the prospects for economic growth and employment in the 
years ahead? At this juncture, the outlook is uncertain - since the out-
come depends substantially on the fortunes of the Carter 
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Administration's tax reduction-tax reform proposals announced on 
January 21, 1978. In broad terms, the Administration recommended a 
net reduction of $24.5 billion of federal income taxes paid by indi-
viduals and businesses. This figure is the result of tax reductions 
amounting to $33.9 billion partly offset by increases of $9.4 billion 
recommended under the heading of "tax reform." Individuals would 
receive about $16.8 billion (over two-thirds) of the net tax reductions, 
and $5.7 billion (just under one-quarter) would benefit the business 
sector. The remaining $2.0 billion would represent a reduction in excise 
taxes on telephones and the repeal of the recently enacted increase in 
unemployment insurance taxes. The tax reductions would become ef-
fective in fiscal year 1979, which begins October 1,1978. 
The Administration explained that one objective of the proposed tax 
reduction is to spur economic growth - which in turn would create 
extra jobs and speed the reduction in unemployment. The expected 
impact of the proposals in this regard can be seen in Table 2 t, based 
partly on estimates prepared by the Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA). It will be noted that the CEA concluded that, in the absence of 
a tax cut, the growth rate of real GNP would be about 4.3 percent from 
the fourth quarter of 1977 through the fourth quarter of 1978. 
Through 1979 the rate would ease off to 3.8 percent and then increase 
to 4.9 percent through the end of 1980. If the tax reductions become 
law according to the recommended schedule, the growth rates for real 
GNP may be lifted to 4.7 percent through the fourth quarter of both 
1978 and 1979 and to 5.0 percent through the end of 1980. 
Expressed in terms of overall economic performance, the tax reduc-
tions are expected to lift real output by $20.9 billion above the level it 
might otherwise reach. Moreover, the added stimulus would help to 
avoid a "growth recession" in 1979 - meaning a rise in real GNP of 
less than the 4.0 percent necessary to prevent an increase in unemploy-
ment. 
If the cut in taxes does not materialize, the overall unemployment 
rate (which averaged 6.8 percent in the final quarter of 1977) may 
decline to 6.3 percent by the end of this year. The same rate may prevail 
in the fourth quarter of next year, and the rate might decline only 
slightly to 5.9 percent by the end of 1980. With the tax reductions in 
place, the unemployment rate may decline steadily to 6.2 percent at the 
end of this year, to 5.8 percent in the final quarter of 1979, and to 5.3 
percent by the end of 1980. 
The level of employment is also expected to rise as the economy 
responds to the stimulus of tax reduction. By the end of 1978, an extra 
70,000 jobs may have been created. As the full impact of the tax cut 
benefits are registered, about 700,000 additional jobs would be avail-
able by end of 1979. The number would be up to 900,000 by the close 
qf 1980. 
t See Appendix, page 59. 
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Finally, the fiscal stimulus is expected to generate a larger increase in 
output (1.4 percent) than in the rate of inflation (0.5 percent). Thus, on 
balance - and judged in terms of the impact on economic growth and 
employment - the proposed tax reduction is clearly desirable. 
Differential Employment Experiences: Black vs. White 
At this point we can turn to a discussion of the differential job ex-
perience of black and white workers in recent years. In general, during 
the 1973-75 recession blacks had to bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden of increased unemployment. Moreover, during the last 33 
months of recovery they have gotten a smaller fraction of the added 
jobs compared with their relative position in the labor market. Over the 
same time period, the level of unemployment among blacks actually 
rose slightly - while total unemployment declined noticeably. 
The major dimensions of labor market trends can be traced in Table 
3t, showing changes in the civilian labor force, employment, and unem-
ployment, by color, sex and age from March, 1975, through December, 
1977. These months mark the recovery of the economy from the 1973-
75 recession - a recovery which began in the Spring of 1975. 
These data document the fact that - so far in the recovery - blacks 
have not participated in the job rebound as fully as have whites. 
Between March, 1975 and last December, the total civilian labor force 
rose by 7.5 percent; the corresponding figures for blacks and whites 
were 13.0 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively. During the same 
period, total employment expanded by 10.0 percent; black employment 
climbed by 14.9 percent; and jobs held by whites rose by 9.4 percent. 
However, the growth in the black labor force (13.0 percent) almost 
equaled the rise in black employment (14.9 percent). Consequently, 
over this 33-month period, the number of blacks without jobs rose by 
1.8 percent - while total joblessness among whites declined by 23.2 
percent. 
Reflecting these mixed trends, the total unemployment rate (which 
had been 8.5 percent in March, 1975) had decreased to 6.4 percent in 
December of last year. The rate last month for whites was 5.6 percent. 
The unemployment rate for blacks in December was 12.5 percent -
only slightly below the 13.9 percent registered when the national 
economy reached the bottom of the last recession. 
In every demographic category, black unemployment rates by 
December of 1977 had fallen proportionately less than was true of their 
white counterparts. The extent to which black unemployment has 
decreased less during the recovery can be seen in the behavior of the 
black-white unemployment ratio. In March 1975, the overall ratio was 
1.78. For youth, it was 2.26; for adult males 1.85; and for adult 
t See Appendix, page 59. 
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females 1.49. By December, 1977, the overall ratio had climbed to 2.23; 
the ratio for youths was 2.96; for adult males 2.22; and for adult 
females, 1.90. 
Further insights into the deterioration of blacks' position in the labor 
market over the last 33 months can also be gotten from the data in 
Table 3. These figur'es show blacks as a percentage of the civilian labor 
force, employment, and unemployment, by color, sex, and age in 
March, 1975; December, 1976; and December, 1977. By comparing 
their employment and unemployment percentages with their share of 
the civilian labor force, one can get a rough impression of the extent of 
the short-fall in blacks' participation in the recovery. For example, in 
March, 1975 blacks represented 11.3 percent of the labor force; they 
held 10.6 percent of the jobs, and they accounted for 18.6 percent of 
the total unemployment. Thus, in the Spring of 1975, blacks had a 
"deficit" of 0.7 percentage point in their share of jobs and a "surplus" 
of 7.3 percentage points in their share of unemployment. Similar cal-
culations are made for blacks by sex and age. . 
Using these calculations, one can trace the progressive deterioration 
in blacks' position over the last 33 months. By December of last year, 
their overall job deficit had risen to 0.8 percentage points, and their 
burden of surplus unemployment had climbed to 11.4 percentage 
points . The same pattern of deterioration is evident among all cate-
gories of black employment. 
These mixed - and distressing - black-white employment patterns 
must be kept in mind as the quest is pursued to expand job oppor-
tunities for the disadvantaged. 
We can now turn to an assessment of several long-run trends in the 
labor force and employment patterns. These will have a direct bearing 
on the magnitude of the structural unemployment problem in the 
future. 
Long-Term Labor Force Trends 
Over the last decade and a half, the growth of the civilian labor force 
has reflected a number of fundamental changes in the nature and 
extent of participation by both women and teenagers. As is generally 
known, the changing composition of the adult population (which in 
turn is a reflection of variations in birth rates) is a principal determi-
nant of the potential size of labor force. The high birth rates recorded in 
the aftermath of World War II - combined with the greatly expanded 
participation of women in the labor market - have caused the civilian 
labor force to increase rapidly, at a rate averaging over 2 percent per 
year since 1960. On the other hand, the drop in the birth rate during the 
1960's and early 1970's will cause a slackening in the rate of labor force 
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expansion during the rest of this decade. For example, the population 
16 to 19 years old (the youth component of the civilian labor force) rose 
by 1.3 percent in 1975. However, this population group increased 0.8 
percent in 1976, and by 0.1 percent in 1977. But, as the shadow of the 
1960's drop in birth rates is cast into the 1970's, the 16 to 19-year-old 
population will decline by 0.2 percent in 1978; by 0.6 percent in 1979; 
and by 1.1 percent in 1980. 
I 
During the last decade and a half, teenagers accounted for a sizable 
fraction of the rise in the civilian labor force. For instance, between 
1960 and 1977, the civilian labor force rose by 29.3 million persons. 
About 4.5 million of this increase (or 15.4 percent) was accounted for 
by teenagers. As a result, teenagers rose from 7.0 percent of the labor 
force in 1960 to 9.5 percent in 1977. The low job attachment of these 
young adults and their slow absorption into the labor market have 
combined to lift the aggregate unemployment rate well beyond what it 
would have been in the absence of the demographic changes noted 
above. Moreover, the labor force participation rates of youths 16 to 19 
years old declined steadily from the late 1940's until the early 1960's. 
Following this period, participation rates began to rise, and the 
uptrend was still evident through last year. This turnaround also 
expanded the youth component of the civilian labor force. But, as men-
tioned above, this bulge in the youth population has just about passed 
through the labor market, and the youth component of the labor force 
should diminish from here on. 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
r , 
The effect on labor markets of increased job-seeking by women will 
also moderate slightly over the remainder of this decade. However, 
women will continue to account for a sizable fraction of the rise in the 
labor force. In 1977 women constituted 36.8 percent of the total labor 
force compared with 30.4 percent in 1960. But over this 17-year time 
span, the number of adult women in the civilian labor force rose by 
15.2 million. This represented 52.0 percent of the total rise over this 
period. The quickened participation of women in the labor force has 
coincided with a decrease in the fertility rates to 1,862 births per 1,000 
women in 1974 compared with a peak of 3,767 in 1957. Data compiled 
by the U.S. Census Bureau suggest that birth expectations are now 
averaging two per family, suggesting a continuation of low birth rates. 
With less time devoted to Child-raising, women entered the labor force 
in increasing numbers during the last two decades. Looking ahead, 
however, it now appears that the rise in women's participation in the 
labor force will be at a somewhat reduced pace. 
-42-
8
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 2 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol2/iss1/4
Trends in Popnlation, Mannfacturing Employment, and 
Money Income in Metropolitan Areas 
In searching for the best means 'to attack structural unemployment, 
we should also keep in mind a number of fundamental long-run trends 
which have had an adverse effect on job opportunities for blacks and 
other marginal groups in the economy. This set of trends involves the 
differential rates of growth in population, jobs, and money income in 
central cities compared with the suburbs of our major metropolitan 
areas . As is generally recognized, over the last decade and a half most 
central cities have experienced an absolute decline in population. A 
substantial number of these cities have also had a relatively larger 
absolute decline in the number of jobs. The net effect has been a clear 
tendency for the cities to fall behind relative to the suburbs. 
To enhance understanding of these trends, data relating to 
population, income, and manufacturing employment were assembled 
for 26 leading metropolitan areas (SMSA's) in the United States. For 
the most part, these SMSA's were ranked according to the population 
of their central cities in 1973. In each case, the SMSA was divided 
between central city and suburbs . Population and money-income 
figures for 1960 are shown in Table 4t. The same data for 1973 are 
shown in Table 5t. Manufacturing employment for 1963 and 1972 is 
presented in Table 6t. Changes in each central city's share of popula-
tion, manufacturing employment, and money income between 1960 
and 1973 are shown in Table 7 t. Figures showing the size of the black 
and working-age population in the selected central cities in 1960 and 
1970 are recorded in Table 8t. Changes in both population categories 
over that decade can be traced in Table 9t. 
A number of insights can be drawn from these statistics . For this 
purpose, the data in Table7tare particularly instructive. Again, these 
figures show changes in the central city's share of population, manu-
facturing employment, and money income in each of these selected 
metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1973. All of the 26 central cities 
shown (except Memphis, Tennessee) lost population compared with the 
total metropolitan area . In other words, during the J3-year period the 
suburbs grew at a much faster rate than did the central cities. The same 
general pattern prevailed with respect to manufacturing employment. 
In this instance, two of the central cities (Indianapolis, Indiana and 
Phoenix, Arizona) increased their share of factory jobs in their respec-
tive SMSA's. San Antonio, Texas expanded manufacturing employ-
ment at the same rate as the suburbs . In the remaining 23 cities, a de-
cline was recorded in their relative share of factory jobs. The trend of 
money income paralleled the trend of population and employment. 
Only Indianapolis and Memphis succeeded in expanding money income 
originating in the central city at a faster rate than was recorded for the 
SMSA as a whole. 
t See Appendix, page 59 -43-
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Moreover, most central cities saw their share of total SMSA money 
income decline at a faster rate than their share of total population. In 
other words, while the typical central city lost population, its relative 
share of factory jobs and other opportunities for its citizens to earn 
income shrank even faster than the decline of total SMSA population. 
This meant that the central cities were left with a relatively weaker 
economic base than was the case at the beginning of the 1960's. 
Along the same lines, the figures in Table 9 show that in all of the 26 
central cities (except Phoenix, Arizona) the black population increased 
as a percentage of the total. The relative changes were particularly 
striking in Detroit, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, and St. 
Louis. In the case of Washington, D.C. (where blacks already repre-
sented 54 percent of the total population in 1960), the increase lifted 
blacks' share of the total to over 71 percent. In Detroit, Baltimore, 
New Orleans, and St. Louis, blacks represented over 40 percent of the 
population in 1970. In Atlanta the proportion was 51 percent. (In pass-
ing, by 1975 blacks represented more than half of the total population 
in several of the cities named.) 
With respect to the working-age population in these cities, another 
important trend stands out. The number of cities which showed an in-
crease in the working-age population as a percentage of the total (12) 
just about equals the number showing a decline in this ratio. However, 
virtually all of the relative decline in the working-age population oc-
curred in the older industrial cities of the Northeast and South. In 
sharp contrast, the cities which gained in working-age population com-
pared to the total were the relatively young and rapidly growing cities 
of the West and Southwest. These tend to be the same cities which ex-
perienced a relatively smaller decrease in their shares of factory jobs 
and money incomes compared with their surrounding suburbs. 
The lesson to be learned from a review of the statistics presented 
above is quite clear: the older central cities in the industrial heartland 
of the nation are finding it increasingly difficult to compete for jobs to 
support their population. Moreover, a rising proportion of the latter is 
being made up by blacks and members of other minorities groups. 
Since the latter find it difficult to compete for jobs under any circum-
stance, they are finding it particularly hard to get jobs in local labor 
markets that are growing more slowly - or actually declining - com-
pared with the nation as a whole. So, when attention turns to the ques-
tion of structural unemployment, a major focus has to be on the 
country's mature urban areas. 
Against this background of long-term trends, we can look more 
closely at one of the widely-supported proposals to reduce structural 
unemployment over the years ahead. The proposal is embodied in the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill. 
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Expected Impact of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill 
Among many persons concerned with structural unemployment, a 
considerable amount of hope is being attached to the Humphrey-
Hawkins Bill - which aims at a significant reduction in the excessively 
high level of unemployment over the next five years. The draft legisla-
tion (sponsored by the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Repre-
sentative Augustus F. Hawkins of California) has been modified suf-
ficiently to attract the endorsement of President Jimmy Carter. Since 
the bill has the support of the Democratic leadership in Congress as 
well as of organized labor, it probably will be enacted before the end of 
1978. 
Given this prospect, one ought to ask whether the faith that is being 
placed in the measure is justified. My own assessment of the potential 
impact of the proposal leads me to be less optimistic than most of the 
bill's proponents. 
Expressed briefly, the Humphrey-Hawkins bill would make the re-
duction of unemployment the single most important objective of na-
tional economic policy. It would establish a numerical unemployment 
rate of 4 percent for the civilian labor force as a whole and 3 percent 
for adults (defined as those 20 years of age and over). These goals 
would have to be met over a five-year period - presumably by 1983. 
Another important goal - although not stated quantitatively - is a 
significant reduction in the extremely high unemployment rates among 
young people. 
The thinking behind the bill assumes that the private sector will be 
the primary source of the jobs needed to achieve the specified goals. 
However, it also would mandate that the federal government use its 
various economic policy instruments for the same purpose. These 
would include timely reductions in income taxes for both individuals 
and businesses - as well as a sizable increase in spending on training 
and public service jobs. Moreover, the Federal Reserve System (which 
influences interest rates and regulates the availability of money and 
credit) would be required to give explicit consideration to the unem-
ployment goals in its conduct of monetary policy. While the revised 
draft recognizes that inflation is also a serious problem, the funda-
mental focus remains on the reduction of unemployment. 
Rationale Behind Proposal 
The motivations which gave rise to the Humphrey-Hawkins bill are 
easily understood: unemployment among blacks and other marginal 
groups has risen persistently in the last three years, while joblessness in 
the nation generally has decreased somewhat as the economy recovered 
from the 1973-75 recession. As noted above, between March, 1975, and 
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December, 1977, the civilian labor force rose by 6,937,000 and the 
black labor force climbed by 1,354,000, representing 19.5 percent of 
the total rise. Over the same period, the number of jobs in the economy 
expanded by 8,382,000, of which 1,328,000 (or 15 .8 percent) went to 
blacks. As a result, the level of unemployment in the economy as a 
whole dropped by 1,445,000, and for whites the decrease came to 
1,471,000. But joblessness among blacks rose by 26,000. 
Reflecting these mixed trends, the total unemployment rate (which 
had been 8.5 percent in March, 1975) had decreased to 6.4 percent in 
December of last year. The rate for whites was 5.6 percent (vs. 7.8 
percent in March, 1975), and the rate for blacks was 12.5 percent (vs . 
13.9 percent in March, 1975). Moreover, the unemployment rate for 
black teenagers was 37.3 percent last December, compared with 12.6 
percent for white youths. In March , 1975, the rate~ were 40.3 percent 
and 17.8 percent for black and white teenagers, respectively. 
Under these circumstances, reaching the Humphrey-Hawkins objec-
tives will be a difficult task. Apparently no firm federal government 
estimates have been made of the number of additional jobs that will 
have to be created if the goals are to be fulfilled. In late November, 
1977, Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall suggested that, during the five 
years ending in 1983, at least two tax reductions of a minimum of $20 
billion each plus 1.0 million extra public service jobs will be required to 
get the overall unemployment rate down to 4 percent. Under the exist-
ing 1973 Manpower program, 700,000 public service jobs have already 
been funded; and the new Youth Employment program introduced in 
January by the Carter Administration authorized another 300,000 
public service jobs. The work requirements of the Administration's 
welfare reform scheme would necessitate 700,000 openings on public 
payrolls; and the original draft of the new urban policy called for an 
additional 300,000. These figures add up to 2 million public service 
jobs by the early 1980's - about double the present number. 
But, as mentioned above, the framers of the Humphrey-Hawkins 
bill are clearly counting on the private sector to generate the bulk of the 
new jobs. In Brimmer & Co. we have estimated that, given the outlook 
for the growih of the national economy, between 1977 and 1983 the 
civilian labor force may expand from 97.3 million to 107.5 million, a 
gain of 10.2 million persons. During the same period, total employ-
ment may rise by 11.4 million (from 90.4 million to 101 .8 million) . The 
level of unemployment might decrease by 1.2 million (from 6.9 million 
to 5.7 million), cutting the unemployment rate from 7.1 percent to 5.3 
percent. 
If this projected 5.3 percent rate is to be cutlo 4 percent, an addi-
tional 1.4 million jobs Ivould have to be found, which would hold the 
unemployment level to 4 .3 million in 1983. For the private sector to 
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accomplish this task, gross national product (GNP) would have to 
expand in real terms at an average annual rate in excess of 5 percent 
during the next five years. Such a pace would be considerably above the 
long-run growth trend which is somewhat less than 4 percent. 
If sustained for such a long period of time, this above-trend rate of 
growth in GNP would push output close to the limits of production 
capacity and stimulate substantial inflationary pressures in an 
economy in which the general price level may already be rising at an 
annual rate close to 6 percent. Consequently, the inflationary potential 
of the public policies required to implement the Humphrey-Hawkins 
bill militates against its mandates being pursued as vigorously as its 
advocates anticipate. 
Moreover, the budget cost of sustaining 2 million public service jobs 
is another factor working against this approach. No precise figures are 
available on the anticipated cost of the program. However, the U. S. 
Department of Labor estimates that in late 1977 each public service job 
costs about $9,000. Thus, even without allowing for the effects of 
inflation over the next five years, the 2 million public service jobs 
would cost at least $18 billion. Given the Carter Administration's ex-
pressed determination to restrain the growth of federal spending, it 
seems highly unlikely that it would request an appropriation of this 
magnitude or spend the funds if they were voted by Congress over the 
Administration's opposition. 
In conclusion, both the inflationary potential and the budget cost of 
the Humphrey-Hawkins bill suggest that its goals are not likely to be 
pressed with a great deal of vigor. So, while the measure will un-
doubtedly continue to attract support, its advocates ought to scale 
down somewhat the overall employment benefits they expect to flow 
from its passage. 
Additional Measures to Reduce Structural Unemployment 
The evidence presented in the foregoing discussion has convinced me 
that little real headway will be made in the reduction of structural un-
employment if heavy reliance is placed on public sector jobs. Instead, 
we must look to greater efforts to expand openings on private payrolls. 
After all, the vast majority of American jobs are found in the private 
arena rather than in the public sector. For example, in October, 1977, 
there were 82.9 million persons on nonagricultural payrolls. Of this 
number, 67.6 million (81.5 percent of the total) were in private employ-
ment, and 15.4 million (18.5 percent) held public sector jobs. Among 
the latter, federal government employment stood at 2.7 million (3.3 
percent), and state and local governments accounted for 12.6 million 
(15.2 percent) of the total, 
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Unfortunately, however, while the incidence of structural unemploy-
ment is most acute among blacks, the latter have historically depended 
relatively more heavily on the public sector for employment than was 
true of the labor force as a whole. This has been especially true of those 
in professional positions. For instance, although blacks represented 
about 10 percent of total nonfarm workers in private industry in 1974, 
they accounted for 16 percent of all civilian employees in the federal 
government. Moreover, while federal employment represented 2.8 
percent of the total jobs in the economy in 1974, about 4.8 percent of 
the blacks in civilian jobs were on the federal payroll. 
As we focus on the expansion of job 'opportunities in the private 
sector, it is clear that employers will need some kind of federal govern-
ment subsidy to help offset the extra costs of hiring any significant 
number of marginal workers. The Carter Administration apparently 
recognizes this point. The fiscal year 1979 budget submitted to 
Congress last week contains $400 million fQr this purpose. Unfortu-
nately, there was no indication of how the funds are to be used nor of the 
number of additional jobs expected to result from the expenditure. 
However, even a brief analysis suggests that one ought to be reserved in 
estimating the probable impact. 
If one assumes that the subsidized private sector jobs would be at the 
entry level and paid the present minimum wage ($2.65 per hour), the 
annual payment to an employee working a 40-hour week would 
amount to $5,512. The employer would have some additional out-of-
pocket costs which might run as high as 15 percent of the payment to 
the worker. This factor would raise the total annual cost to $6,339 per 
job. Of course, there is no way to estimate how large a subsidy an em-
ployer would require to induce him to offer such a job. But given the 
prospect that such a new worker's productivity is likely to be sub-
stantially below that of the average employee, the necessary subsidy 
may be as large as 25 percent of the firm's cost. If this ratio were 
applied, the needed subsidy would be in the neighborhood of $1,585 
per job. At this rate, the $400 million in President Jimmy Carter's 
budget would help to generate about 252,000 extra jobs. 
This last figure should be contrasted with the number of jobs which 
might result if the $400 million were spent to create public service jobs. 
As noted above, an official in the U. S. Department of Labor recently 
estimated that such jobs on the public payroll might cost about $9,000 
each. At this rate, the $400 million would finance about 44,000 open-
ings - a figure less than one-fifth of the number that may result from 
using the funds in the private sector. 
If private firms were asked to provide an additional 252,000 jobs, 
partly with federal government assistance, the impact on each em-
ployer would not be very great. For example, in 1975, the 500 largest 
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industrial corporations in the United States had 14,413,000 employees, 
an average of 28,826 per firm. If these 500 firms alone were asked to 
provide the extra 252,000 jobs, each would have to absorb about 504 
additional workers. This latter figure would represent around 1.7 per-
cent of the average number of employees on the payroll of each of 
these largest corporations. Clearly, they could manage such a task and, 
in fact, go far beyond such a modest request. 
In addition to subsidies for new entry-level jobs, private employers 
will also need inducements to locate production, distribution, and ser-
vice facilities in central cities. It was shown above that such cities are 
being left with a disproportionate share of total metropolitan popula-
tions, compared with the number of job opportunities in their respec-
tive metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the growing migration of 
firms and the jobs they offer from central cities to suburbs reflects real 
incentives (such as lower taxes, less crime, and greater availability of 
skilled workers). If central cities are to compete successfully for such 
employers, the latter must be offered strong incentives to remain - or 
to return. 
One such inducement might be found in allowing firms to draw 
down, or assign, a large proportion of the unused investment tax 
credits (ITC) many of them have accumulated if they establish job-
creating facilities in central cities. 
In 1972 (the latest year for which U. S. Treasury figures are avail-
able), American corporations claimed $3.8 billion in new investment 
tax credits (against $62.8 billion of investment outlays eligible for the 
lTC). They already had $2.7 billion in carryovers from previous years, 
making a total of $6.5 billion in credits that could have been used. 
However, in that year, these firms claimed only $3.0 billion of the total 
available, leaving unused $3.5 billion (or 53.8 percent of the total). 
Businesses do not use all of their ITC eligibility for a variety of 
reasons, the main one of which appears to be the lumpiness of capital 
expenditures relative to taxable income. (The ITC can be used to offset 
only 50 percent of tax liability.) A substantial part of the unused credits 
will eventually be drawn down, but some portion will expire. So, in one 
sense, such unused credits would be "wasted." Alternatively, firms 
which cannot use such credits before they are scheduled to expire might 
be allowed to assign their potential claims to another business who 
could use them to help offset the costs of investment expenditures, 
provided the latter was made in central cities or other areas suffering 
from a substantial amount of structural unemployment. The extra 
budget costs of such a proposal would not be very large, certainly no 
larger than the potential loss in tax revenue to which the U. S. Treasury 
is already exposed if firms elect to claim the tax offset for investment in 
suburbia or other vigorously growing areas. The extra administrative 
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burden of this approach to the management of the ITC would not be 
particularly heavy since the Treasury Department has already accum-
ulated considerable experience in administering the ITC with differen-
tiations on the basis of varying standards of eligibility. 
In the meantime, this type of linkage of the ITC to specific invest-
ment targets might enable central cities and other needy locations to 
turn in a somewhat better performance in attracting job-creating 
facilities. 
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